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Regional Economic Outlook

Navigating the Pandemic:

A Multispeed Recovery in Asia

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Navigating the Pandemic: A Multispeed Recovery in Asia

1. Overview


The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is stil¹⁰ unfolding around the globe. In Asia, as elsewhere, the $_{\rm 8-}$ virus has ebbed in some countries but surgers in oth The global economy is beginning to recover after a 6 sharp contraction in the second guarter of 2020, as 4 nationwide lockdowns are lifted and replaced with more targeted containment measures. Global growth has been revised up since the June 2020 World Economic Out (WEO) Update to 4.4 percent in 2020, because of better-than-expected second quarter outturns in some 2major countries where activity began to improve sooner than expected after lockdowns were scaled back. In 2021 global growth is projected at 5.2 percent, a little lower-6than projected earlier, consistent with the expectation that social distancing persists into 2021 and fades thereafter 19

e Asia and Paci c region is also starting to recover tentatively, but at multiple speeds. Economic activity is expected to contract by 2.2 percent in 2020, due to a sharper-thanexpected downturn in key emerging markets, and tensions-particularly US-China-may also derail point lower and 0.3 percentage point higher, respectively, than in the June 20201d Economic OutlookUpdate(Figure 1.1).

e outlook varies by country depending on infection rates and containment measures, the scale and e ectiveness of the policy response, reliance on contact-intensive activities, and reliance on external demand. In parts of Asia where virus transmission rates are low, mobility Scarring is likely, however, as labor market participation has fallen, and output is expected to remain below pre-pandemic trends over the likely to be hit the hardest.

e forecasts remain highly uncertain, with signi cant downside risks. A resurgence of the pandemic cannot be ruled out. Geopolitical

Figure 1.1. Real GDP Growth Rates (In percent)



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. Note: EMDE = Emerging and Developing Economies.

to grow by 6.9 percent in 2021-0.6 percentage the recovery. A rise in social unrest triggered by the pandemic's disproportionate impact on the poorest and most vulnerable could compromise recent hard-won gains, or a return to risk aversion in nancial markets could add to balance sheet vulnerabilities. Prospects for an early, large-scale rollout of an e ective vaccine creates an upside risk.

With the pandemic seemingly far from over, policy support should be sustained and, in some cases, and activity could normalize faster than elsewhere. measures are vital until the pandemic has abated. Targeted scal spending is needed until the recovery is entrenched. It should aim at the most medium term, with the most vulnerable in society vulnerable where scal multipliers are highest, and to jobs-oriented, inclusive, and green investment. Looking ahead, credible scal plans will be key to secure debt sustainability. Monetary policy should remain supportive. Elevated credit risks demand continual monitoring, especially where debt levels

are high. Policymakers need to redouble e orts recovery is projected to be more gradual than to keep workers connected to the labor force an¢reviously forecast. In 2021 global growth is solvent rms in business while allowing nonviabl¢rojected at 5.2 percent, 0.3 percentage point rms to exit, and facilitating new businesses to lower than projected in June 2020, re ecting the emerge and generate new job opportunities, an¢resistence of social distancing into 2021. thus mitigate scarring.

Green Shoots in Asia

is Regional Economic Outlobrakws on studies analyzing the impact of COVID-19. Chapter 3 examines the e ect of containment and related policy measures on health outcomes and economic activity. Fast implementation of containment measures and appropriately timed exits—supported by strong testing and contact tracing policies—have been key in stabilizing COVID-19's spread while mitigating its economic costs in many Asian economies. Fiscal support has also been critical to reduce economic costs, underpin recovery, and limit scarring. Chapter 4 warns that the crisis is having the largest impact on low-income workers, women, and youth, and so is increasing inequality. ese distributional e ects could be even larger in the medium term as robots displace low-skilled workers, and the resulting higher levels of inequality could undermine social cohesion. Policies should be targeted to mitigate the pandemic's adverse distributional consequences and so underpin overall economic activity and virus containment.

2. A Multispeed Recovery in Asia

Global Context

e COVID-19 pandemic plunged the world into a sharp recession in the rst half of 2020. Service sector activity, which relies on person-to-person contact, took a big hit. Manufacturing also weakened substantially, and global trade plummeted. Global growth is projected at -4.4 percent in 2020, 0.6 percentage points above the June 20/2/0rld Economic Outlook Updaterecast. e upgrade re ects a better second quarter outturn in major countries that eased lockdowns earlier than expected. e

e pandemic is at various stageam.que,aC64.4 peojected insucoj

Economic activity is beginning to revive, starting with China.After hitting a trough in February 2020, China's growth received a boost from infrastructure, real estate investment, and a surge in exports, mainly of medical and protective equipment, as well as work-from-home-rel-7.Dd

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countries have started diversifying their economies and moving up the value chain. However, a fundamental reorientation of take time and considerable policy e ort. For small economies (such as the Paci c island vulnerability to natural disasters make it exceptionally di cult to reorient away from tourism, commodities, and remittances.

e extent of scarring will depend on economies' reliance on contact-intensive activities; market rigidities; digital penetration, technological capacity, and availability of remote working; and policy space to support resource reallocation. Weak household, corporate, and nancial balance sheets may add to scarring.

Uncertainties, Unknowns, and Risks

Although early success in developing an e ective vaccine could lead to a guicker and stronger recovery, the downside risks are considerable.

- A second wave of the pandemic cannot be ruled out.
- Escalating US-China tensions spanning trade, nancial ows, technology, and geopolitics could pose major economic risks, given Asia's major role, among other things, in global value chains.
- e pandemic's disproportionate impact • on the poorest and most vulnerable will exacerbate already high and rising income and wealth inequality in Asia and could engender social tensions.
- A return to tighter nancial conditions could • exacerbate pre-pandemic vulnerabilities (such as highly leveraged public and private sector balance sheets), tip struggling corporations and small and medium enterprises into bankruptcy, worsen credit risk and nancial stability, and aggravate debt overhangs.


Policies: From Green Shoots to a Smart, Green, Inclusive Recovery

growth models toward domestic demand will A full arsenal of policy support is needed. Asia and Paci c countries have already provided signi cant scal policy support to cushion the countries), their size, remoteness, and high pandemic's impact. Likewise, central banks have cut policy rates, injected liquidity, and introduced unconventional measures: such support should continue because of the extent of evident economic slack across the region. However, the pandemic's prolonged duration is creating stru [(.al bankss.)llder s f0.1ld

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3. COVID-19 Lockdowns and Exits in Asia: Some Lessons

is chapter uses new data and novel modeling techniques to examine the e ect of containment and implemented, Noemissions-a proxy for policy measures in a ecting the health and econorma activity-cumulatively fell by almost consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Lockdowns: The Importance of Acting Fast

e analysis quanti es the impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the number of infections and on economic activity using real-time containment measures implemented by apan (10 percent), and Vietnam (15 percent) in 129 countries (Deb and others 2020a; 2020b). Daily data on the number of COVID-19 infections and fatalities are used, along with novelost. is is particularly important for the Paci c high-frequency indicators of economic activity, such as the level of nitrogen dioxide (NO emissions. e results suggest that containment measures have been e ective in attening the pandemic curve. For example, the very stringent containment measures put in place in New Zealand (such as an international travel ban and early restrictions on gatherings and public events, followed quickly by school and workplace closures and stay-at-home orders) are likely to have reduced the number of infections by almost 90 percent relative to a baseline of no containment measures (Figure 3.1, panel 1). Containment measures have been associated with a strong decline in mobility and were more e ective in halting the spread of the virus in countries where de facto mobility was curtailed the most, either because of compliance or greater voluntary social distancing stemming from fear of becoming infected (Figure 3.1, panel 2; October 2020World Economic OutloOkapter 2). e attening of the pandemic curve ensured that medical systems were not overwhelmed and reduced fatalities, laying the foundation for recovery (Figure 3.1, panel 3) and medium-term growth (Barro and others 2020).

While necessary to save lives and pave the way for recovery, containment measures resulted in large short-term economic losses. e analysis suggests that in countries where stringent measures

99 percent 30 days after their implementation, relative to the country-speci c path without containment (Figure 3.1, panel 4). Translating this into economic terms, containment led to about a 12 percent decline (month-on-month) in industrial production, which is in line with the decline in industrial production observed in many Asian countries after lockdowns, including China (more than 10 percent) in January-February,

April. e impact of containment has been adverse across all sectors, but tourism has been a ected the island countries and other Asian economies that



did relatively well compared with other regions,



Exit Strategies: Timing Is Key

of containment measures would increase economic activity by only about 6 percent (Figure 3.4, panel

Several Asian economies began to ease lockdownsIn other words, scarring from the pandemic is early, and as a result, many containment measurage adv apparent in the weak recovery thus far. had already been lifted by July. Exit strategies vary e average ectof exits on economic activity also across countries (Box 2.1), but in general, they masks signi cant heterogeneity across countries. have been accompanied by an improvement in Strong testing and tracing policies, implemented economic activity (October 2020 rld Economic Outlook Chapter 2). However, because of changes Korea for instance, along with targeted in individual behavior associated with the fear of lockdowns, appear crucial for avoiding a spike in becoming infected and measures left in place to infections when containment is eased (Figure 3.4, maintain social distancing and reduce contagion panel 2). To minimize the risk of a second wave, health considerations suggest that without herd the positive impact of exiting lockdowns on economic activity has been smaller in magnitude immunity, reliable vaccines, or e ective treatment, the rollback of strict containment should begin than the negative impact of lockdowns. e only when there are clear signs that new infections analysis shows that, on average, lockdowns are declining (WHO 2020). Many Asian led to a contraction in economic activity (as economies seem to be following this strategy. measured by industrial production) of about 12 percent a month, but an eventual full reversal Testing and tracing policies at the time of exit were Figure 3.4. Easing of Containment Measures Has Asymmetric Effects, Depending on the Strength of Testing and **Tracing Policies**


Easing of containment measures has led to a pickup in economic activity, but this effect is less pronounced ...


... and is associated with a larger increase in the number of COVID-19 infections in countries with weaker testing and tracing policies at the time of exit.

1. Industrial Production, Deviation from Baseline (Percent, implied impact on industrial production 30 days after containment/ reopening) 8 -6 -Δ -2 -

REHGENWIYDVROBPOEROLED (Log percentage points, 30 days after relaxation of containment measures) - 100 - 80 - 60

Asian countries had relatively strong testing and tracing policies at the time they eased lockdowns.





Source: Deb and others (2020b)

Containment

0

-2 -_4 -

-6 -

-8 -

-10 -

-12 -–14 ^L

Note: The bars show the impact after 30 days on industrial production (implied by changes in NO₂ emissions) to a unitary change (tightening during containment and easing during reopening) in the containment measures relative to a baseline of no change. Changes in NO2 emissions are translated into industrial production using estimated historical elasticity of 0.015.

Reopening

Source: Deb and others (2020b).

Strong

Average

Note: The bars show the impact after 30 days on the number of coronavirus disease infections to a unitary easing in the containment measures relative WRDEDVHOLQHRIQRFKDQJH7KHpUVWEDUVKRZVWKH average effect, and the other two bars highlight the impact under strong and weak testing and tracing policies at the time of easing of lockdowns. The pJXUHLVGLVSODNGLQORJŠHUFHQWDJHSRLQWV7KH lighter shade indicates effects not statistically VLJQLpFDQWDWWKHSHUFHQWOHYHO

0

Weak

Testing and tracing policies


at the time of exit

Source: Deb and others (2020b). Note: The index was calculated as the simple average of testing and contact tracing policies available from the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker. The horizontal line inside each box represents the median; the upper and lower edges of each box show the top and bottom quartiles, respectively; and the top and bottom markers denote the maximum and the minimum, respectively. X is the mean.

Central Asia

relatively high in Asia (Figure 3.4, panel 3), and signi cant increase in mobility (which proxies the median seven-day average of new cases wais dividual behavior in relation to the fear of less than 1 per million people—among the lowestlecoming infected) and economic activity. By across all regions (Figure 3.5, panel 1). contrast, in countries that started reopening when

the number of new infections was still high and e analysis indicates that appropriately timing increasing, mobility did not increase signi cantly the exit from lockdowns is key to limiting the risk of a new wave of infections, restoring con dence activity (Figure 3.5, panel 3). Model simulations (Figure 3.5, panel 2), and neither did economic boosting economic activity, limiting scarring also illustrate another dire consequence of exiting e ects, and laying the foundation for a stronger too early and before the pandemic peaks: early recovery. Empirical results show that in countries exits lead to a signi cantly higher number of were very low, exits have been associated with a





economy into a second recession and weaken the tata provided by the IMF Policy Tracker on medium-term recovery (Figure 3.5, panel 4).

Macroeconomic Policies Can Mitigate Economic Costs and Support Recovery

Supportive policies can mitigate the economic


discretionary scal and monetary measures implemented and announced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, empirical analysis con rms that such policy measures have been e ective in mitigating the economic costs associated with containment measures. Such measures had a much larger impact on economic activity-

equivalent to a 22 percent decline in industrial costs of containment measures. Using aggregate roduction-in countries with relatively small

scal packages. Likewise, some of the adverse impact of containment measures was mitigated in countries with larger cuts in policy rates (Figure 3.6, panel 1).


To shed more light on the e ectiveness of scal measures, a daily database of new announced scal plans—encompassing direct scal measures as well

Figure 4.1. Selected Economies in Asia: Non-Teleworkable Sectors, Gender Gap, and Youth Unemployment



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

1RWH29, 'FRURQDYLUXVGLVHDVH*)& OREDOpQDQFLDOFULVLV&LDUHIHUV to Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, The Philippines, and Vietnam. Data are seasonally adjusted, based on June 2020 data (or latest available). Essential industries refer to agriculture, utilities, transport, information and communication, and health and public administration; social industries refer to wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants, and arts and entertainment; WHOHZRUNDEOHLQGXVWULHVUHIHUWRpQDQFHEXVLQHVVDQGSURIHVVLRQDOVHUYLFHVDQG education; and non-teleworkable industries refer to mining, manufacturing, and construction.



Source: Haver Analytics.


Note: Asia refers to Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand. Data refers to the change in unemployment rate from December 2019 to June 2020. Data are seasonally adjusted. The horizontal line inside each box represents the median; the upper and lower edges of each box show the top and bottom quartiles, respectively; and the top and bottom markers denote the maximum and the minimum, respectively. X is the mean

productivity, but the analysis suggests that it also increases inequality by displacing workers in routine manual occupations, which have low earnings.

Robot adoption (measured by new robot installations per 1,000 employees, collected by

automation and robotization. Automation raises the International Federation of Robotics) tends to increase after pandemic events (Figure 4.2, panel 1), especially when the such events are associated with a signi cant economic contraction. is is in line with the literature showing that rms tend to undertake restructuring after recessions and adjust production toward labor-saving technologies (Hall 2005; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Hershbein

- 2. Change in Labor Force Participation Rate by Gender during Crises (Percentage points)
 - COVID-19 (2019:Q4 versus 2020:Q2, or latest available)



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations. 1RWH&9, FRURQDYLUXVGLVHDVH*)&OREDOpQDQFLDOFULVLV&LDUHIHUV to Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Data are seasonally adjusted. For COVID-19, data are up to June 2020.

and Kahn 2018; Carbonero, Ernst, and Weber 2018). It is also consistent with recent studies showing that pandemic-induced uncertainty could add to the incentives for automation on net,




Figure 4.3. Pandemics, Inequality, and Social Unrest

(Figure 4.3, panel 1)Higher social unrest, in turn, is associated with lower economic activity in the extent of redistribution (measured as the the short term and with higher inequality. ese results are consistent with the nding that externalet Gini coe cient): an increase in inequality is shocks raise risks to growth and social stability (Rodrik 1999).

e analysis nds that the e ect of inequality on social unrest is stronger when income inequality is initially high (Figure 4.3, panel 2). An increase in Breaking the Vicious Cycle: the net (post tax and transfer) Gini coe cient is associated with higher social unrest when the level of the net Gini is above 40-about one-third of than this threshold. e analysis also nds that


¹In line with the October 2020/orld Economic Outlo®iox 1.4, no signi cant short-term e ects were found.

the impact of inequality on social unrest depends di erence between market Gini coe cient and associated with more unrest when redistributive transfers are low, suggesting that redistributive measures indeed help to reduce social tensions.


Policies and the Way Forward

Countries with broader social safety nets, greater Asian economies have a net Gini coe cient highescal space, lower levels of informality, and higher digitalization have been able to respond e ectively in protecting the vulnerable, but countries that entered the crisis with weaker initial conditions faced greater challenges (Figure 4.4, panel

1). Advanced economies introduced targeted cash transfers more than emerging market and developing economies did (Figure 4.4, panel 2). e degree of digitalization likely played a role, helping to reach citizens in need: low-income and emerging market countries that introduced targeted cash transfers (for example, Cambodia and India, see Chapter 2) had, on average, higher digitalization scores than those that did not introduce these measures. Most advanced economies also introduced enhanced unemployment bene ts, wage subsidies, and scal support to rms. Less frequent adoption of such measures among low-income countries and emerging markets was likely related to a higher degree of informality, which made reaching the workers and rms more challenging.



Optimal policy with targeted transfers results in a higher GDP relative to the one with untargeted transfers ...



... which leads to a lower pandemic debt accumulation.

Note: TT = targeted transfers; UT = untargeted transfers.

e favorable e ects are larger for targeted than Although there is no one-size- ts-all best policy, for untargeted measures. e former help reduce the model suggests that it is economically and inequality in disposable income and preserve socially bene cial to provide targeted support to a higher consumption share of GDP for the the unskilled. To minimize longer-term damage, unskilled (Figure 4.5). is saves more lives policies should also address challenges from because unskilled workers tend to be more exposed mation, including by revamping education to the health crisis. e reduction in infections curriculums to achieve more exible skill sets and fatalities, in turn, helps reduce the depth of and lifelong learning, as well as new training for the recession and therefore attens the surge in adversely a ected workers. the debt-to-GDP ratio. e model suggests that, compared with untargeted transfers, targeted transfers raise GDP by some 3 percent and lower the debt-to-GDP ratio by 6 percentage points.

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